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Introduction
Indonesia has subsidized all types of fossil fuels since 1967. In the past, Indonesia was able to produce around 1.6 million barrels of oil per day and used the revenue from oil exports to subsidize all fuel products, including foreign aircraft and ships (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources [MEMR], 2010). 1 After the Asian crisis created unprecedented shocks in Indonesia's economy in 1998, various attempts were made to reduce fossil-fuel subsidies in order to trim the state budget. However, the policy has not yet had a significant impact because the domestic consumption of fuel products (especially for gasoline, kerosene and diesel) has increased, while oil production decreased. In addition, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) was reluctant to reduce fuel subsidies, arguing that they are a pro-poor program with the objective of poverty alleviation (World Bank, 2010; Coady, Gillingham, Ossowski, Piotrowski, Tareq & Tyson, 2010; Plante 2013) . Energy subsidies, both for fuel and electricity, are still the biggest burden on Indonesia's state budget (30 per cent of the central government budget, or 20 per cent of the total state budget).
Indonesia has not been a net oil exporter since 2004, after its consumption of oil surpassed its production.
2 Fuel subsidies have thus continued to increase and forced the GoI to either cut other allocations or widen the budget deficit (Aswicahyono, 2011) . Both strategies basically will only result in a more fragile Indonesian economy. On one hand, adding debt for consumption will raise the interest rate burden instead of generating revenue in the future. On the other hand, cutting capital expenditure allocation, especially for infrastructure, will create an inflation trap since infrastructure is a significant transaction cost in Indonesia. Another reason for the increasing fragility of the Indonesian economy is the increasing importation of fuel: indeed, the importation worsens the country's balance of payments and results in currency depreciation.
While various studies show that fossil-fuel subsidies are not the best way to increase social welfare, most Indonesians still believe that removing them will create poverty and suffering (Bacon & Kojima, 2006; Adam & Lestari, 2008; Agustina, Arze del Granado, Bulman, Fengler, & Ikhsan, 2008; Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2008; Yusuf, 2008; Yusuf & Ramayandi, 2008; Askolani, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Aswicahyono, 2011; Granado, Coady, & Gillingham, 2012; Dartanto, 2013; Perdana, 2014) . Those studies also showed that most of the benefits of fossil-fuel subsidies are enjoyed by the wealthier groups in society, create problems for developing energy security and are not environmental friendly. Agustina et al. (2008) identified the impact of prolonged implementation of fuel subsidies: (i) in reducing the fiscal space to invest in infrastructure or in human capital; (ii) in inefficiencies in targeting the poor; (iii) in creating disincentives for households to consume in an efficient way; (iv) in undermining macroeconomic stability; (v) in distorting price signals to industry and households; and (vi) in creating opportunities for smuggling and corruption.
Various studies have assessed the impact of fossil-fuel subsidies and the potential impact of reducing or eliminating fuel subsidies in Indonesia (Adam & Lestari, 2008; Agustina et al., 2008; Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2008; Yusuf, 2008; Yusuf & Ramayandi, 2008; Askolani, 2010; World Bank, 2010 , Aswicahyono, 2011 Dartanto, 2013; Perdana, 2014) . However, few studies have attempted to investigate household perceptions of reduction or elimination of the fuel subsidies (Pradiptyo & Sahadewo, 2013a , 2013b Pradiptyo et al., 2014) . Unfortunately, those 1 During President Suharto's era (new order era), the Government of Indonesia (GoI) subsidized most fuel types starting in the early 1970s.
This included kerosene, diesel oil, gasoline, fuel oil and aviation fuel. After President Suharto stepped down in 1997, the fuel subsidy was gradually reduced, starting with the removal of the subsidy for aviation fuel in 1998, gasoline and diesel oil subsidy for marine transport in 1999, and diesel oil subsidy for mining and international transportation in 2001. 2 Shortly after the Asian crisis in 1998, oil production decreased while consumption increased. In 2004, oil consumption surpassed production and the gap has widened since. One of the negative results of this oil deficit was Indonesia withdrew from OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporter Countries) membership in 2008.
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The Role of Information in Perception of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: Evidence from Indonesia 2 studies were carried out only in certain selected areas in Indonesia. A thorough study on household perceptions of FFSR in Indonesia is critical, and the results of such a study will provide hard evidence on how households actually perceive FFSR.
The analysis of this study is based on a survey that was conducted in August 2014, a period during which the Indonesia government faced a tremendous fuel subsidy burden because international oil prices were still high. At the time, the prices of the subsidized gasoline and diesel were Rp6500/litre and Rp5500/litre, respectively, as stipulated by the government decision in June 2013. 3 Soon after President Joko Widodo was sworn in, the new administration took a drastic action by increasing the price of the subsidized gasoline and diesel to Rp8,500/litre and Rp7500/ litre, respectively, on November 18, 2014. The substantial reduction in international oil prices gave the Indonesian government a window of opportunity to reform the subsidies that were increasingly weighing on the government's budget. On January 1, 2015 the administration introduced a more market-based energy pricing mechanism by which the government will announce administered fuel prices every two weeks in line with international prices. The prices of gasoline and diesel decreased on January 1, 2015 to Rp7,600/litre and Rp7,250/litre, respectively. Simultaneously, the Jokowi administration capped subsidies for Diesel at Rp1,000/litre, scrapped subsidies on gasoline except those for distribution costs to non-central areas of the country. This policy decision marked a turning point in the history of Indonesian fossil-fuel subsidies policy. On January 19, 2015, the prices of subsidized gasoline and diesel were decreased to Rp6,600/litre and Rp6,400/litre, respectively.
The tendency toward a constant reduction in international oil prices may not be prolonged in the long term. They may bounce back, fluctuate or tend to increase as in previous years. Consequently, the government may be forced to increase the price of fuel. In these circumstances it will be important that the government be informed about the perception of fossil-fuel pricing and subsidies in order to communicate effectively about its energy pricing policies. This paper aims at contributing to that debate. The results of this study are therefore highly relevant for policy-makers.
This study aims to analyze household perceptions toward FFSR in Indonesia, using survey data collected by the LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia) in all 34 provinces of Indonesia in August 2014. This is the first comprehensive dataset of household perceptions toward FFSR, which covers sufficient respondents in all 34 provinces in Indonesia. Based on this comprehensive dataset, this study aims to answer several questions: a. Which groups in society have a higher acceptance for a fuel subsidy removal policy? b. What factors are attributable to the public's familiarity with the price of subsidized fuel? c. What factors are attributable to the public's familiarity with the government's budget allocation for fossil fuels?
d. What factors are attributable to changing the public's preferences for FFSR after they receive actual information about the fuel subsidy?
e. What factors determine the public's preference for reduction strategies (sudden and/or gradual removal)?
f. Which factors may be attributable to the public's preferences for compensation and/or reallocation policies if the fuel subsidy cuts will be undertaken?
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Methodology

Data
According to the description of the LSI's database on its survey of fuel subsidies, the number of respondents in the LSI's dataset was 2,900. Of the 2,900 respondents, 13.8 per cent could not be contacted and replacement of the respondent was made. Owing to the failure to contact one respondent and to find a substitute, the data actually are based on 2,899 respondents. As Indonesia's population is 237.6 million, the sample number is proportional to 0.0012 per cent of the population. 4 The sample size of 2,899 will have a ± 1.86 per cent margin of error at the 95 per cent confidence level, assuming a simple random sampling was conducted by LSI. This study focused only on Premium 5 (a subsidized gasoline, RON 88), so that most questions in the survey relate exclusively to this fuel type. Pertamina (Indonesia's state-owned oil and natural gas corporation) sells Premium through their gas stations nationwide.
Regression Method
How people perceive subsidized fuels may be investigated from several perspectives. Firstly, people's perception toward of whether they agree with fuel subsidy reform or not, prior to receiving information about the fuel subsidy, may be determined by the heterogeneity of personal attributes. In this case, the respondents' perceptions serve as the dependent variable, and their personal attributes serve as the independent variables that may consist of age, gender, education, rural/urban location, income, and island/location. Thus, a logistic regression (logit) model approach was used since we have a binary dependent variable (the dependent variable can have only two possible types: agree vs disagree). The logit model provides for a binary response by maximum likelihood; it models the probability of outcome for a given set of repressors. Logistic regression is used to predict the odds of respondents agreeing with FFSR based on the values of their personal attributes. The odds are defined as the probability of respondents agreeing with fuel subsidy reform divided by the probability that they disagree.
Like other forms of regression analysis, logistic regression makes use of one or more predictor variables that may be either continuous or categorical data. Unlike ordinary linear regression, however, logistic regression is used for predicting binary outcomes of the dependent variable (treating the dependent variable as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial) rather than a continuous outcome. A brief elaboration of the assumptions of logistic regression:
1. The true conditional probability is actually a logistic function of the independent variables. 6. The independent variables are not linear combination of each other.
To assure a unique estimate of the regression coefficients (avoiding multicollinearity problem), this study dropped variables (respondents' personal attributes) that are a perfect linear combination of the others, leaving only the variables that are not exactly a linear combination of others in the model. The results should be interpreted carefully since correlation between independent variables was noticed. The correlation coefficients can be seen in Appendix B.
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Secondly, people's perception toward whether they agree with fuel subsidy reform or no was determined by receiving certain information about the fuel subsidy. This study investigated the effects of information on the respondents' perceptions toward subsidized fuel. In the LSI survey, each respondent was initially asked about his/her perception toward whether they agree with fuel subsidy reform or not. Afterwards the interviewers, explained the fuel subsidy budget and the state budget, and then they asked the same question again to record any difference in the respondents' perceptions. Taking the difference in answers before and after providing the information, there were three possible outcomes: (1) changed answers from agree to disagree, (2) same answers, and (3) changed from disagree to agree. In this case, we have three possible discrete outcomes. A multinomial logistic regression model was used to analyze this outcome. Slightly different from the logit model, a multinomial logit model is a model that fits maximum likelihood models with discrete dependent variables when the dependent variable takes on more than two outcomes and the outcomes have no natural ordering.
LSI conducted a random selection multistage cluster sampling in eight stages. There are several potential pitfalls in ignoring complex sample design, such as LSI's multistage sampling, which was used in this survey. Neglecting complex survey design implies treating LSI's dataset as a simple random sample, which it actually is not. The effects of clustering and stratification will incorrectly estimate a biased standard error (Skinner & Vieira, 2007 ) . In order to minimize bias in the standard error, LSI's dataset needs to be readjusted since LSI used multistage cluster random sampling instead of simple random sampling. After the dataset was readjusted by taking into account the multistage cluster random sampling, the dataset was characterized as follows:
a. Sampling weights (also known as probability weights) are proportional to the inverse of the probability of being sampled. Since LSI's survey did not have significant differences between survey findings and Indonesia's census data, the weight variable was considered as equal to one for all respondents (i.e., no different weight should be applicable to different respondent).
b. The collection of respondents will be sampled as a group or known as a cluster. Following the LSI's approach, villages were characterized as the primary sampling units (PSUs). Cluster sampling was conducted to incorporate the possibility of a larger variability if we sampled the respondents directly.
c. Since different groups of clusters are sampled separately or independently (even though with the same random sampling approach), respondents' strata are more homogeneous than the population as a whole. Accordingly, this study stratified LSI's dataset based on LSI's sampling stratification.
In this study, the characterization was conducted by specifying the variables that identify the survey dataset (province, rural-urban, and gender). The logit and multinomial logit regression were used by this rearranged dataset to reduce any potential bias. Applying characterization to the variables into a logistic/multinomial logistic model is also known as a survey logistic/multinomial logistic approach. Thus, a survey logistic approach was used throughout the logistic model and a survey multinomial logistic approach was used throughout the multinomial logistic model.
This study has an exploratory nature, of which a number of different models have been developed to explain the behaviour of a dependent variable of interest. This study did not postulate "theoretical" coefficients from the regression model. Analysis of LSI's survey was guided by substantive (social or economic) theory in choosing explanatory variables and in determining the form of the relationship. This study neglected complex ratio adjustments for each estimation since LSI's sampling proportion was already based on the "real world" or actual population proportion. This was supported by the finite population correction (FPC) numbers that were equal or almost equal to one. It should be noted that the odds ratios from the estimations were not displayed, the marginal effects (∂Y⁄〖∂X〗_i ) from each explanatory variable are the ones which are displayed on the regression results throughout this paper. It estimates the margin of responses for each specified value of covariates from each exploratory variable.
The Role of Information in Perception of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: Evidence from Indonesia 5
Results and Discussions
Individual's Perception of the Subsidy Removal Policy
There are several questions on the LSI's survey that will help us to expose the relationship between the individual's personal attributes and their opinion of FFSR. In this survey, the respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that the GoI should conduct FFSR. There were also questions to reveal each respondent's personal attributes. The questions to identify whether the respondents agreed with FFSR can be seen in Box 1. Several questions in the box are modified from the original questions in the questionnaire. We have modified it to present them in a simpler way. For question (d), level of education was converted into year of education in the regression analysis. For question (g), provinces were converted into five regions: Sumatera, Java-Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi (Celebes), Nusa Tenggara and Moluccas-Papua. Detailed description of the questions can be seen in the appendix. We explored the relationship between the individual's personal attributes and their opinion on FFSR to understand which groups in society have a higher acceptance of FFSR.
According to Figure 1 , we found that only 21 per cent of the respondents (618 from 2,899) agreed with the FFSR proposal. Male respondents tended to be more receptive to the idea of FFSR with 27 per cent of them agreeing to it, 9 percentage points more than their female counterparts. Individuals who live in urban areas had a marginally bigger proportion of respondents (23 per cent) who agreed with FFSR than those who live in rural areas (20 per cent). A similar result occurred for respondents' education levels, as the higher their education level, the more they agreed with FFSR, compared with individuals with less education.
We did not find any difference in the perception of FFSR (whether agree or disagree) by income distribution in Figure per cent who are in the very poor group. It indicates that the richer the respondent, the more they were to agree with the idea of FFSR.
BOX 1. QUESTIONS ON RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT FFSR AND THEIR PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES IN THE LSI SURVEY
a. In your opinion, do you think that it is better for the government to reduce the fuel subsidy? 
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FIGURE 1. INDIVIDUAL'S OPINION OF FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM, BY GENDER, URBAN/RURAL AREA, AGE GROUP, AND EDUCATION
Source: Authors' calculations using data from LSI's survey.
FIGURE 2. INDIVIDUAL'S OPINION OF FFSR, BY AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME AND SELF-PERCEIVED WEALTH STATUS
The individual's acceptance of FFSR also differs on a regional scale. Hereafter we categorize the islands of Java and Bali as one region, remembering those two islands do not differ too much in terms of population structure, economy, competitiveness, infrastructure and access to the Premium (subsidized fuel) retail price. The urban population in Our findings, as presented in Figure 3 , show that regions other than Java/Bali have a higher proportion of those who agree with FFSR 6 , except in Sulawesi (Celebes) which also has a low level of acceptance.
FIGURE 3. INDIVIDUAL'S OPINIONS OF FFSR, BY REGION
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LSI's survey.
Further exploration was conducted using logistic regression on several models. We converted the individual's opinion into a binary dependent variable: 1 if they agreed that the government should reduce the fuel subsidy and 0 if otherwise. The regression on five different models allows us to obtain the marginal effects of each independent variable as in Table 1 . Those five models are a simulation to find a robustness and consistency of the interaction of variables. The results in Table 1 confirmed our previous findings. In all regression results, it was found that respondents who were older, with a higher education level and a higher income were more likely to agree with the FFSR plan. The results also confirmed that male respondents were more likely to agree with the FFSR than women, as do the individuals who live in urban area. Individuals who own a motorcycle or car were more likely to reject the idea of the FFSR than those who do not own any motor vehicles.
Other findings deduced from Table 1 above show that those who live outside the Sulawesi region are more likely to agree with FFSR, with a relative comparison of Java-Bali region for regression 4 and 5. In regression 3 and 4, the respondents in Kalimantan also reject the idea of FFSR. Extra care should be taken in interpreting the result in regression for Kalimantan since the sign of the coefficient changes when we incorporated the interaction between Kalimantan and education year (see regression 2 and 3 vs regression 4 and 5). Similar patterns have been found in other models throughout this paper.
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The higher the individual's education, the more likely he/she would be to agree to the fuel subsidy reform-each additional year of schooling increased this probability by 1.7 per cent. However, the higher the education level attained by those who live in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara lessened the likelihood of agreement with FFSR. In contrast, education increased the likeliness of the respondents who live in Sulawesi and Papua approving of FFSR. Education also had a positive effect on those who own motorcycles or cars compared to those who do not own. Higher education levels increase the likelihood that motorcycle and car owners agreed with the FFSR.
Individual Ignorance and the Government's Lack of Information Dissemination
The dataset from LSI shows that many respondents failed to state thecorrect official price for Premium gasoline set by the government, 7 or did not know that the GoI is subsidizing it. Furthermore, most of them did not know how much of the government's budget is allocated for fuel subsidies. This problem may arise owing to either an individual's ignorance or the government's failure in disseminating information related to fuel subsidies. In this section, we investigate which groups in society are familiar with the official retail price of Premium fuel, know that the government is subsidizing it, and know how much the government is budgeting for the fuel subsidy.
Our first analysis in this section is to identify which groups are familiar with the official retail price of Premium fuel. We use Premium's (RON 88) retail price since it is the most commonly consumed subsidized fuel. Box 2 displays the questions in the survey that were used in this analysis. Findings shown in Figure 4 reveal that 65 per cent of the respondents correctly answered with the official retail price of Premium. Almost 75 per cent of male respondents knew the official Premium retail price; about 20 per cent more than the same proportion within the female group. 73 per cent of the respondents in urban areas stated the right retail price of Premium, while only 55 per cent of those who live in the rural areas were correct. The older respondents had a lower proportion of those who mentioned the correct retail price of Premium relative to those in the younger age groups. Groups with a higher level of education had a bigger proportion of those who knew the right official Premium retail price compared to those with a lesser level. In the higher education group, 85 per cent gave the right 7 In this section, we distinguish between the "official" Premium price and the "non-official" Premium price. The "official" price is the government-administered price that is used in gas stations. The "non-official" price is the price that may be charged by illegal vendors of Premium fuel, when they buy fuel from gas stations and then sell it on to others outside the gas station. Survey respondents were asked if they knew the "official" Premium price. 8 Respondents were given seven options to answer: Rp4,500, Rp5,500, Rp6,500, Rp7,500, Rp8,500, others, and do not know/answer. The official Premium retail price during the survey was Rp6,500; other answers were categorized as being wrong.
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answer, 45 percentage points more than the same proportion in the no education group. These results are very likely to be affected by unobservable factors, such as the fact that older groups do not drive as much as the younger groups and the higher education groups receive more information than those in lower education groups.
FIGURE 4. KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFICIAL PREMIUM RETAIL PRICE, BY GENDER, AREA, AGE GROUP, AND EDUCATION LEVEL
FIGURE 5. KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFICIAL PREMIUM RETAIL PRICE, BY AVERAGE INCOME PER MONTH AND SELF-PERCEIVED WEALTH
Source: Authors' calculations using data from LSI's survey. Our findings in Figure 5 suggest that the higher the income, the bigger the proportion of those who answered with the correct official retail price of Premium. The self-described wealth groups show a similar pattern except for the middle group. The rich and very rich groups have a lower proportion of respondents who know the official retail price compared with the relatively less wealthy groups. Several unobserved factors, once again, may play a role in this result, as there is a strong possibility that these groups require a higher octane of fuel for their vehicles. However, it leads them to be ignorant of the official retail price of Premium even though they should have better access to information.
In Figure 6 , we can see that the eastern part of Indonesia has a lower proportion of those who know the official Premium retail price. Maluku & Papua have the lowest proportion, with only 33 per cent of respondents giving the right retail price. This might indicate the government's failure in disseminating information.
FIGURE 6. KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFICIAL PREMIUM RETAIL PRICE, BY REGION
Subsequently we used a logistic regression to estimate the probability of correctly answering the official retail price of the Premium (RON 88) question, and obtained the marginal effect as shown in Table 2 . It shows that the personal attributes of the respondents' correlate with the probability of correctly answering the official retail price of Premium. Educated to a higher level, being male, of a younger age and living in an urban area increased the probability of answering the official retail price of Premium correctly. These respondents tend to be more exposed to information about fuel prices, and hence are more likely to answer correctly. The negative coefficient on age might have three reasons: (i) the decline in the cognitive functions affects their ability to recall the correct price; (ii) the older respondents are less inclined to obtain information related to Premium's characteristics; or (iii) they ask the younger ones to buy Premium for them. Other findings from the logistic regression in Table 2 are that the knowledge of the official price of Premium is affected by whether the respondents own a vehicle and where they live. Those who have a vehicle (motorcycle, car or boat) answer correctly with the official price of Premium. In addition, results in Table 2 show that only respondents living in Nusa Tenggara gave the right answer according to the regression 5. This regression is assumed to be consistent because regressions 2 to 4 were addressed to test the control variables. Once again, education level plays a key role in the regression, as the well-educated owners of motorcycles or cars were less able to answer the question correctly. Also, the respondents with higher education levels who live in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua were more likely to answer the question correctly, whereas the contradictive result applies to the well-educated respondents in Nusa Tenggara and Sumatera. It indicates that information and knowledge received by the respondent, regarding to the fuel subsidies policy, are different in each region.
GSI REPORT MARCH 2015
The Role of Information in Perception of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: Evidence from Indonesia 13
The second analysis in this section examined which groups in society know that the GoI is subsidizing Premium gasoline fuel. During the interviews, respondents were given information about the official retail price of the Premium at the time-IDR 6,500 per liter-and also informed that the GoI had to acquire the fuel from domestic and international sources. The respondents then were asked whether the price of fuel paid by the GoI was lower, the same, or higher than the official retail price of the Premium. It was assumed that who answered that the price the GoI paid to acquire the fuel was lower or the same as the official price of the Premium did not know that the government subsidizes Premium. In Figure 7 , we can see that a larger proportion of male respondents knew that Premium is a subsidized fuel compared to the female group; nevertheless, both are below 50 per cent. The urban area group has a smaller proportion of respondents who are aware of it than those in rural areas, despite putatively having more access to information. There is relatively little difference between age groups, all having well-informed respondents below 50 per cent of the group. On the other hand, there is a pattern within education levels. Those with higher levels of education made up a larger proportion of those who are well-informed. The same pattern can be seen in the average monthly income distribution in Figure 8 . Higher monthly average income groups had a larger proportion of respondents aware that Premium is subsidized by the government (Figure  8a ). Meanwhile in Figure 8b , we can see that the very rich group has less proportion of well-informed respondents about the government's role in subsidizing fuel. Similar to the official retail price issue, this indicates that the very rich group is ignorant of the fossil-fuel subsidy issues.
FIGURE 7. AWARENESS THAT PREMIUM IS A SUBSIDIZED FUEL, BY GENDER, DOMICILE AREA, AGE GROUP, AND EDUCATION LEVEL
FIGURE 8. AWARENESS THAT PREMIUM IS A SUBSIDIZED FUEL, BY AVERAGE INCOME PER MONTH AND SELF-PERCEIVED WEALTH
Source: Authors' calculation using LSI's data.
The conjecture that wealthier groups are ignorant of fossil-fuel subsidy issues is supported in Figure 9 . Similar to the age and gender groups, the percentage point differences between the well-informed groups in each region are relatively small. This indicates that the very rich group in Figure 8b might choose to be ignorant of the issue. 
FIGURE 9. AWARENESS THAT PREMIUM IS A SUBSIDIZED FUEL, BY REGION
Source: Authors' calculation using LSI's data.
We further explored our analysis by regressing the awareness that Premium is a subsidized fuel to respondents' personal attributes using the logistic regression in Table 4 . We set the dependent variable as a dummy variable which equals 1 if the respondents knew that the price of fuel purchased by the government was higher than the government's official price (above Rp6,500 per litre) and 0 if otherwise. The results in Table 4 reveal that education, income, and age are positively correlated with the probability of respondent awareness that Premium is a subsidized fuel. Male respondents are more likely to know this than female respondents. Ownership of a motorcycle also increased the probability of being well-informed about this issue relatively more than those who do not own any motor vehicle, although the opposite happens if respondents own a car or boat. Those who live in the Sulawesi region were less likely to know the information relative to those who live in Java-Bali. Surprisingly, those who live in Maluku or Papua were more likely to know that Premium is a subsidized fuel relative to respondents in Java-Bali. Attaining higher education for respondents in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku & Papua lessened the likelihood of knowing the information. A similar thing happens to respondents who own a motorcycle(s). However, it increases the likelihood of knowing the information for respondents who own a car(s) and boat(s).
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The last analysis in this section is to measure the government's success in disseminating information of their budget allocation for the fuel subsidy. The questions used for this analysis are provided in Box 3. In the original point (a) question, respondents were asked to allocate 50 coins into 10 categories of the government's budget allocation. Those categories are government administration, national defense, healthcare, education, social security, infrastructure, agriculture, fuel subsidy, public transportation, and other. Empirically, the correct answer is 18 per cent. It implies that respondents should allocate 9 coins to the category for the government's allocation for the fuel subsidy. We then set a standard deviation of 10 per cent so that those who answer 7-11 coins are categorized as knowing the government's allocation for the subsidy. Otherwise, we categorize them as giving the wrong answer.
From Figures 10, 11 , and 12, we can see that most of the respondents do not know the government's allocation for fossil-fuel subsidies: in total, only 26.6 per cent of respondents could identify the correct share of expenditure.. In almost every category, less than 30 per cent of the respondents answered with the correct allocation. This is an indication that the GoI has failed to disseminate the information related to it.
FIGURE 10. AWARENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR FUEL SUBSIDY, BY GENDER, DOMICILE AREA, AGE GROUP, AND EDUCATION LEVEL
Source: Authors' calculation using LSI's data. 
BOX 3. QUESTIONS ON RESPONDENTS' AWARENESS OF BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR SUBSIDY AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTE QUESTIONS IN LSI'S SURVEY
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FIGURE 11. AWARENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR FUEL SUBSIDY, BY AVERAGE INCOME PER MONTH AND SELF-PERCEIVED WEALTH
FIGURE 12. AWARENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR FUEL SUBSIDY, BY REGION
Information and Opinion Changing
Immediately after being questioned about their preference on FFSR, respondents were asked several questions which contained important facts and information about the FFSR, e.g., whether they know that Premium is a subsidized fuel, how much the government allocates for the fuel subsidy, and which groups of society enjoy the most benefits from the fuel subsidy. After each question, respondents were given the correct answer to it. This built up to the point where the respondents were again asked about their preference for FFSR. Figure 13 presents the respondents' opinion about FFSR before and after being provided with the information, by gender, domicile area, and age group. Respondents who agreed with the FFSR policy, in the male and female group, increased by 14 and 13 percentage points to 41 per cent and 29 per cent respectively, while the urban and rural groups increased to 36 per cent and 34 per cent. As seen in Figure 13 (c), information about the FFSR had less effect on the oldest age group (over 79 years old) as they may be less likely to drive at that age. Those who agree in that group only increased by 9 percentage points; compare to the average 19 percentage points in the younger groups. 
FIGURE 13. OPINION ON FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION, BY GENDER, URBAN/ RURAL AREA, AND AGE GROUP
FIGURE 14. OPINION ON FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION, BY EDUCATION LEVEL
According to Figure 14 , information had the biggest effect in changing the opinion of those who graduated from vocational schools, with 23 percentage points of increase to 58 per cent in education level category. The percentage of respondent to change their opinion from rejecting FFSR to agreeing with it gets higher for those who hold higher education level. It also had the biggest effect on those with a higher average monthly income as shown in Figure  15 . Interestingly, the information decreased the proportion of those who agreed with FFSR in the very rich group by 17 percentage points to 33 per cent (see Figure 16 ). The same proportion in the rich group only increased by seven percentage points, half of the average increases in the less wealthy group. 
FIGURE 15. OPINION OF FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION, BY AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME
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FIGURE 16. OPINION OF FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION, BY AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME
In Figure 17 , we can see that the Nusa Tenggara group displayed the largest proportional increase of those who agreed with FFSR, up 21 percentage points from 33 per cent. The proportion of those who agreed with FFSR in Sulawesi (Celebes) increased by only 9 percentage points to 26 per cent.
FIGURE 17. OPINION OF FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION, BY REGION
Source: Authors' calculation using LSI's data. By using multinomial logistic regression on five models, we obtain Y1 by setting the value to be between -1 and 1. If Y1 = -1, it means that the respondents changed their opinion from agreeing to disagreeing with the government's plan for FFSR; Y1 = 0 for status quo; Y1 = 1 for changing their opinion from disagreement to agreement with FFSR. Since the sample for Y1 = -1 is too small (30 respondents), it might induce statistical problems-we only see those who changed their opinion from disagree to agree. The results in Table 5 show that personal attributes play a role in changing opinions of FFSR. Since we dropped the observation of the respondents who changed their opinion from agreeing with FFSR to disagreeing with it on this multinomial logistic regression, we found that the better-educated, male, older, richer, wealthier and urban respondents tended to change their opinion from disagreement to agreement with the FFSR policy. The car-owning respondents also had the same perspective on FFSR.
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Other results are that the better-educated respondents who own cars and motorcycles tended to stand by their opinion of FFSR, while the owners of boats changed their opinion from disagreement to agreement. The respondents' area of domicile also affected the possibility of them changing their opinion from disagreement to agreement with FFSR. According to regression 5 in Table 5 , respondents in Sulawesi, Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara and Kalimantan tended to change their opinion from disagreement to agreement, after having received the information regarding the fuel subsidy.
Fossil-fuel Subsidy Reform Scheme
The LSI's survey put several questions to the respondents about whether the fuel subsidy should be eliminated gradually or all at once. It was first explained to the respondents that the gasoline price without a subsidy is Rp10,500, and they were told to imagine a scenario in which the next government 10 would increase the price. The respondents had to choose between two options for the FFSR scheme, either an all-at-once or a gradual fuel price increase. They were also informed of the pros and cons of each option. An all-at-once increase would provide the government with the immediate fiscal space to increase the budget allocation for public services such as health care, education, and road maintenance. Yet poor people would experience a big shock to their purchasing power due to the increases in other prices. Gradual subsidy elimination would lessen the impact of the FFSR on the poor. However, the benefits from it in public service improvements would not be experienced immediately.
In addition to the personal attributes questions, we also investigated questions about their opinion of the FFSR reallocation program, their degree of trust in the GoI to reallocate the fuel subsidy appropriately, and whether they are the beneficiary of the BLSM and/or BPJS 11 programs (see Box 4).
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In Figures 18, 19 and 20, we can see that most respondents preferred a gradual increase in the subsidized fuel price. However, half of the respondents in rural areas preferred an all-at-once price increase. The Nusa Tenggara region had 30 per cent of its respondents preferring an all-at-once increase, while Maluku & Papua region only had 7 per cent.
FIGURE 18. FFSR SCHEME PREFERENCE, BY GENDER, DOMICILE AREA, AGE GROUP, AND EDUCATION LEVEL
Source: Authors' calculation using LSI's data. As in previous analyses, we investigated further by using the logistic regression method to estimate the probability of the respondents choosing a gradual or all-at-once fuel price rise. There are nine models using the logistic regression with the following results: Tables 6 and 7 are the results for the estimation of the respondents' opinions on whether the FFSR scheme should be gradual or all at once. Regressions 1 to 8 are addressed to testing all the control variables, while regression 9 summarizes the marginal effect of all the independent variables to the probability of being in agreement with an all-at-once fuel price increase. It was found that personal attributes have an effect on it, except for the respondents' income. Respondents who had a higher level of education tended to agree with an all-at-once fuel price increase, if FFSR was going to be implemented. This result is similar to the male, older and urban respondents who tended to be more likely to agree with an all-at-once fuel price increase. We should note that the percentage increases are small for those variables. The car owners do the opposite, as this variable has a negative effect, while the boat owners agree with the total removal of fuel subsidies. Also, the wealthier the respondents, the higher their probability of rejecting the FFSR scheme to increase the price of fuel price all at once. 
FIGURE 19. FFSR SCHEME PREFERENCE, BY AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME AND SELF-PERCEIVED WEALTH
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The interesting results are found from the effects of information regarding fuel subsidies, that after the respondents had received the information, they tended to agree with a total removal scheme for the FFSR. Nevertheless, the respondents who did agree with compensation and reallocation programs after the FFSR were more likely to agree with the total removal of the fuel subsidies. Another interesting result is that the respondents who put their trust in the GoI to manage the compensation and reallocation programs after the FFSR policy has been enacted were more likely to reject the total removal of the fuel subsidies. These results seem to be confusing and inconsistent with previous opinions of the respondents. However, it may show us that the respondents are not well-informed and have difficulties in understanding the fuel subsidies program in Indonesia.
Compensation and Reallocation of the Subsidy Savings
In the LSI's dataset, several variables were collected in relation to the households' perceptions on compensation and reallocation if the subsidy were to be reduced. We used several additional questions as shown in Box 5.
Almost every group had more than 50 per cent of respondents who think that the government should provide certain reallocation program(s) as compensation for the FFSR policy (see Figures 21, 22 and 23 ). However, in Figure 22 , there is a pattern that the wealthier groups have fewer respondents who approve of the reallocation programs than the less wealthy groups. We used the logistic regression in order to estimate the probability of the respondents agreeing with compensation and reallocation programs if the fuel subsidies were removed. The estimation results of logistic regression are shown in Table 8 below. The number of the respondents who did not believe that the money saved by the FFSR policy would be used for compensation and reallocation was low. Only 7 per cent of the respondents did not believe it would happen, and 11.73 per cent of the respondents were very doubtful that it would be used properly for compensation and reallocation programs after FFSR occurred. However, 39.53 per cent of the respondents were quite doubtful that the money saved would be used for compensation and reallocation programs. Corruption was the most common concern for those who were considerably doubtful that the GoI would enact such programs (48.51 per cent), followed by mis-targeting of the GoI's programs (29.66 per cent) and the GoI's incapability to implement such programs (17.34 per cent).
BOX 5. QUESTIONS ON RESPONDENTS' OPINION ABOUT THE REALLOCATION PROGRAM, PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES, AND OTHERS IN THE LSI'S SURVEY
The results in Table 8 above show that, once again, personal attributes play a role in affecting the respondents' perceptions of compensation and reallocation programs after FFSR occurs. The probability of agreeing with compensation and reallocation programs rises if the respondents are male, as it does with the higher income group. However, the more educated, older and urban respondents were more likely to reject the compensation and reallocation programs. This suggests that there is distrust toward government's ability to reallocate the subsidy properly among those groups. This result is similar with those who own a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, car or boat. The interesting results came as the probability of agreement with the compensation and reallocation programs decreased when the respondents have received information regarding fuel subsidies, while the level of trust in the GoI had an opposite result. The probability of rejecting the compensation and reallocation programs increases if the respondents are wealthier. This might be induced by the fact they are not the beneficiaries of the program.
Education plays an important role in this estimation, as the better-educated respondents who own a vehicle would tend to agree with the compensation and reallocation programs. However, the better-educated respondents in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi would reject the compensation and reallocation programs. This result is the opposite of the behaviour of those more well-educated respondents in Maluku/Papua. However, domicile-area variables (in dummy) show that the respondents who live in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi agree with the compensation and reallocation programs. Again, this result is the opposite of the Maluku/Papua respondents' behaviour.
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Discussion and Recommendations
In summary, analysis from the survey showed that most Indonesians are against a price-increase policy on fossil fuels. This presents resistance toward the government's plan for fossil-fuel subsidy removal. However, identifying which groups have a higher acceptance of subsidy removal policies and what factors contribute to it, helps explain the public's resistance to subsidy removal. The survey was analyzed with logistic and multinomial logistic regression approaches. The results showed that an individual's opinion about FFSR was correlated with the individual's gender, income, education, vehicle ownership, and the region she/he lived in. This indicates that the public's opinions regarding subsidy removal are not permanent opinions-they may change. From a spatial perspective, the results of this study showed that where people live plays a significant role in determining their opinion regarding subsidy removal. People who live in Java and/or urban areas tend to have a lower acceptance of policies to remove subsidies. Yet, further analysis is required to confirm this result as well, for example by either performing panel data analysis or using an instrumental variable.
Education and vehicle ownership played a significant role in determining an individual's opinion. The results from this study showed that higher education levels correlated with a higher acceptance of subsidy removal. Owning a motorcycle and/or car correlated with lower acceptance. This might help explain why removing the subsidies from fossil fuels has not become easier over time. Subsidizing fossil fuels leads to lower fossil-fuel prices but at the same time generates an opportunity cost regarding educational development programs. Thus, higher numbers of vehicles and lower educational development lead to lower acceptance of subsidy removal. Low acceptance generates greater resistance toward government plans to remove the subsidy. High resistance enhances pressure on the government to keep increasing the budget for fossil-fuel subsidies since fossil-fuel demand is increasing. 
